Following Myanmar’s military coup in February 2021, the State Administrative Council (SAC) established checkpoints between towns under its control and rural areas increasingly governed by anti-junta resistance forces. Here, military personnel command trade and extort from people, inflating the price of consumer goods and agricultural inputs and restricting the mobility of civilian and anti-junta actors. In response, resistance forces set up their own checkpoints to cut supply lines, monitor the movements of SAC troops and tax the passage of (mostly) high-value goods. Based on fieldwork in Sagaing Region and Chin State between 2022 and 2024, this article develops a theoretical framework to understand the relational dynamics at and between checkpoints operated by SAC and resistance forces, and examines the resulting shifts in livelihoods and social roles. Interactions at roadblocks and their structural consequences highlight the adaptive and relational nature of the fiscal social contract between armed authorities and civilians during wartime. The junta deploys checkpoints to extract revenue and impose punishment, while resistance forces use them to undermine military supply lines and levy taxes to fund the armed struggle and social governance. Rural livelihoods have been upheaved as the complexities, costs and risks of navigating checkpoints prompted reduced cash cropping, deepened reciprocity practices and altered social roles, particularly for women. Despite the junta’s goal of suppressing organized dissent, these shifts have ultimately reinforced rather than weakened sustained community support for resistance forces.
This article is part of a special issue on ‘The Politics of Passage: Checkpoints and Authority amidst Conflict’ in Development and Change, and based on the Roadblocks and Revenues series co-published by ICTD, the Danish Institute of International Studies, and the Centre on Armed Groups.
