This article examines the impact of natural resources on civil wars by focusing on the challenges faced by armed groups attempting to profit from Myanmar’s opium sector. Economic theories of conflict hold that the presence of lootable resources can prolong civil wars by providing non-state armed groups with the resources and incentives to challenge the state. However, the emphasis on the presence of lootable resources and the capabilities of armed groups overlooks how these groups convert resources into wealth. This study examines Shan State in Myanmar during the first three decades of its post-World War II opium boom. While the increased opium production in Shan State offered a potential revenue stream for the dozens of non-state armed groups, the remnants of Chiang Kai-Shek’s Kuomintang forces dominated the trade. Drawing on the ‘politics of passage’, an approach attentive to the competing claims on trade in war zones, this article examines the various impediments faced by armed groups attempting to profit from the opium trade. Its findings indicate that revenue generation by armed groups was much more challenging than economic theories of civil war suggest. The article highlights a need to move beyond the mere presence and extraction of resources by powerful armed groups and to pay closer attention to the mundane but formidable challenges of profiting from a valuable resource sector.
This article is part of a special issue on ‘The Politics of Passage: Checkpoints and Authority amidst Conflict’ in Development and Change, and based on the Roadblocks and Revenues series co-published by ICTD, the Danish Institute of International Studies, and the Centre on Armed Groups.
