This study examines the role of checkpoint taxation in both the emergence and the disintegration of neo-patrimonial political order in Afghanistan. While it focuses on the administrations of Hamid Karzai (2001–14) and Ashraf Ghani (2014–21) and the Taliban’s insurgency (2001–21), it situates these dynamics within a long historical trajectory. It argues that control of checkpoints as rent-generating sites and the allocation of access to them are crucial for consolidating patrons’ influence over strongmen and powerful elites. While neo-patrimonialism and checkpoint taxation have each been studied independently, their intersection and the implications for political order and disintegration remain under-explored. Drawing on interviews, secondary sources and the author’s professional experience with fiscal reforms in Afghanistan, the article suggests that access to checkpoint rents is central to sustaining neo-patrimonial political order, while its disruption fuels conflict and ultimately regime change. It further demonstrates that the Taliban’s victory was enabled in part by the failure of the Afghan government and its international partners to recognize the historical importance of trade route control in shaping conflict cycles.
This article is part of a special issue on ‘The Politics of Passage: Checkpoints and Authority amidst Conflict’ in Development and Change, and based on the Roadblocks and Revenues series co-published by ICTD, the Danish Institute of International Studies, and the Centre on Armed Groups.
