Policy Research Working Paper 9032

This paper presents a conceptual framework for developing more effective approaches to tax reform and compliance. The framework proposes that by combining complementary investments in enforcement, facilitation, and trust, reformers can not only strengthen enforced compliance but can also (a) encourage quasi-voluntary compliance, (b) generate sustainable political support for reform, and (c) create conditions that are more conducive to the construction of stronger fiscal contracts. A key challenge for governments lies in finding the right combination of these three measures—enforcement, facilitation, and trust— to achieve revenue and broader development goals. The framework proposes greater reliance on locally grounded binding constraints analysis, coupled with careful attention to understanding politics and the drivers of trust in particular contexts, to guide analysis of how best different investments may be combined, prioritized, or sequenced. This framework can help policy makers to think about the right combination of strategies in specific contexts, and thus to allocate resources most effectively

Authors

Wilson Prichard

Wilson Prichard is an Associate Professor at the University of Toronto, a Research Fellow at the Institute of Development Studies, and Chief Executive Officer of the International Centre for Tax and Development. His research focuses on the relationship between taxation and citizen demands for improved governance in sub-Saharan Africa.

Anna Custers

Anna is an Economist at the World Bank. She focuses on fiscal policy in developing countries. In particular, on domestic resource mobilization, including both customs and tax reform, as well as the role of trust, morale, and equity in tax systems. Prior to joining the World Bank Anna worked with the Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL) in both India and France.

Roel Dom

Roel Dom is an Economist at the World Bank, focusing on tax and customs, and in particular on the role of trust and digitization. Prior to joining the World Bank, he worked as a Research Fellow for the International Centre for Tax and Development and for the Overseas Development Institute, where he worked closely with revenue administrations in lower-income countries and fragile states.

Stephen Davenport

Michael Roscitt

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